UIC Law Review
Volume 46

Issue 2

Article 1

2013

The Efficacy of the Negative Injunction in Breach of Entertainment
Contracts, 46 J. Marshall L. Rev. 409 (2013)
Eliot Axelrod

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Contracts Commons, Courts Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Legal Remedies Commons

Recommended Citation
Eliot Axelrod, The Efficacy of the Negative Injunction in Breach of Entertainment Contracts, 46 J. Marshall
L. Rev. 409 (2013)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol46/iss2/1
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more
information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

Do Not Delete

3/12/2013 5:35 PM

THE EFFICACY OF THE NEGATIVE
INJUNCTION IN BREACH OF
ENTERTAINMENT CONTRACTS
ELLIOT AXELROD*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Many aspects of the entertainment business are highly
speculative and entertainment firms are known to invest heavily
in developing and marketing the various products they create.
While revenues from successful entertainment projects can be
enormous, these successes are frequently offset by other expensive
flops. As performers become more individually successful, they
become generally more concerned with maximizing their own
personal profits than with helping to subsidize development of
entertainment projects to benefit their successors.1 When it comes
to remedies for breach of entertainment contracts, it is a constant
battle to find a fair balance between the interests of entertainment
entities seeking to make a profit—or at a minimum, recoup their
investments—and performers seeking artistic autonomy and
financial leverage.
Entertainment corporations have consistently relied on
equitable remedies to prevent artists from evading their
contractual obligations.2 A negative injunction to prevent a party
from working elsewhere has particular appeal in the
entertainment industry. While the typical legal response to
contract breach in most situations is damages for loss incurred, it
can be very difficult if not impossible to measure the loss of a star
* Professor of Law, Chair Emeritus Department of Law, Baruch College, City
University of New York. The author also has extensive experience in the
practice of entertainment law.
1. See Patrick Healy, Broadway Hits Gold in Buffalo, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
23, 2011), available at http://theater.nytimes.com/2011/12/24/theater/sheasperforming-arts-center-in-buffalo.html?_r=0 (noting that “only 20 to 30
percent of Broadway shows ever turn a profit.”); Chris Jones, Rialto Hits Miss
(May
23,
2011),
available
at
a
Payback,
VARIETY
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118037392/?categoryid=4076&cs=1&cmpid
=RSS %7CNews%7CLegitNews (stating that “[i]t’s a perennial Broadway
truth that only 20%-30% of shows pay back their investors. The percentages
really haven’t changed much over the last 60 years.” (quoting Charlotte St.
Martin, Executive Director of Broadway League)).
2. David F. Partlett, From Victorian Opera to Rock and Rap: Inducement
to Breach of Contract in the Music Industry, 66 TUL. L. REV. 771, 785 (1992).
409
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attraction. Additionally, even assuming that the breaching party is
not judgment-proof, actual damages or the lost profits from an
unfulfilled venture may be far too speculative to prove to a court’s
satisfaction. While damages are generally an effective remedy in
many situations, employers of talent have often turned to the
negative injunction remedy.
After presenting a brief history of the application of the
negative injunction in personal service contracts, this Article
examines the legal and ethical pros and cons of the application of
the negative injunction in entertainment contract cases, analyzes
negative injunction trends going forward, and then posits for its
continued use with limitations.
II. HISTORY
The enforcement of a personal service entertainment contract
by means of a negative injunction dates back to the landmark
English case of Lumley v. Wagner in 1852.3 In that case, an opera
singer, by contract, bound herself to sing exclusively for three
months at the plaintiff’s theatre.4 When she attempted to breach
the contract and join a rival troupe, the plaintiff sued both her and
her new employer. The chancellor granted a negative injunction
preventing the defendant from performing for the rival company.5
The court reasoned that, while it could not specifically enforce the
contract,6 an injunction preventing the defendant from performing
her services elsewhere might cause her to return and perform her
contractual obligations.7
Other nineteenth century cases expanded further upon
Lumley, holding that it is not necessary to include a specific
negative injunction clause in a contract as long as it was clear that
the services were to be exclusive8 and unique.9 An even broader
holding occurred in 1894 when an English actor who breached his
contract with a touring company in the United States was enjoined
from performing in England while he was under contract to

3. Lumley v. Wagner, (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687; 1 De. G. M. & G. 604.
4. Id. at 605.
5. Id. at 619.
6. See ABC, Inc. v. Wolf, 52 N.Y.2d 394, 402 (N.Y. 1981) (noting that it
has long been a principle of equity that a court will not order specific
performance of a personal service contract because (1) it would be impossible
to monitor and enforce the compliance of an unwilling party, and (2) it would
violate the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on involuntary servitude).
7. See Lumley, 42 Eng. Rep. 687; 1 De. G.M. & G. 618 (showing that while
the Chancellor’s reasoning was unavailing in the defendant’s case, in that she
did not return to perform for the plaintiff, the grounds for a negative
injunction were established).
8. Webster v. Dillon, (1857) 30 L.T.R. (N.S.) 71.
9. Id.
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perform in the United States.10 Early entertainment cases in the
United States essentially followed the precedents set in these
English cases.11
With regard to the uniqueness of the services as a
prerequisite to granting a negative injunction, this requirement
implies that the subject services are not readily replaceable by the
employer, and that monetary damages would be of no help as a
remedy.12 In commenting on the effect of not awarding a negative
injunction in cases of truly unique services, in a 1928 case13 the
New York Supreme Court’s Appellate Division said:
If the time shall ever come when a court of equity must stand
helplessly by while unique and unusual theatrical performers may
be induced to breach contracts with impunity, except for such
damages as a jury may see fit to award at some distant date,
theatrical corporations will find their business hampered by
intolerable conditions.14

While the time remaining under the original breached
contract is important, in a 1937 case,15 the court issued a negative
injunction against the then well-known actress, Bette Davis,
preventing her from making films, her chief career, or appearing
on stage in England for the remainder of her contract or for the
formidable period of three years, whichever would be shorter.16

10. See Grimston v. Cunningham, (1894) 1 Q.B. 125 (explaining that this
extensive restriction meant, in essence, that the employer did not have to
show any competitive harm).
11. See generally Daly v. Smith, 38 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 158 (1874) (citing cases
from England where the courts decided whether or not to grant injunctions in
engagement/employment contract breach cases); Mapleson v. Del Puente, 13
Abb. N. Cas. 144, 147 (N.Y. 1883) (referencing the decision in Daly v. Smith,
which was based on English Court precedent).
12. See Am. League Baseball Club v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6, 13-14 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1914) (applying the Lumley case in an interesting manner by explaining
that the athlete in that case was “the foremost first baseman in professional
baseball[,]” and that while this seemed to satisfy the “unique and individual”
rule in Lumley for injunctive relief, the court found the player’s agreement
lacked mutuality of obligation and remedy and that the negative covenant did
not have “consideration to support it” and was “unenforceable by injunction.” );
see also Phila. Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 217 (1902) (implementing
the Lumley rule and discussing adequacy of damages in such cases).
13. Harry Rogers Theatrical Enters., v. Comstock, 232 N.Y.S. 1, 4 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1928).
14. Id. at 3.
15. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Nelson, [1937] 1 K.B. 209 at 213-16
(Eng.).
16. See id. at 217 (explaining, however, that the court refused the
plaintiff’s request that Davis be barred from all entertainment work). It also
appeared that because Davis had said that she would not make further films
for the plaintiff, she was suspended from her exclusive studio contract with
plaintiff and taken off the plaintiff’s payroll when the suit was commenced. Id.
The court would not order a negative injunction unless the company lifted the
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III. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
It is well settled that the remedy of specific performance will
not be granted for personal service contracts.17 Originally, this rule
evolved because of the inherent difficulties courts would encounter
in supervising the performance of uniquely personal services.18
“During the Civil War era . . . a more compelling reason for not
directing the performance of personal services”19 emerged, namely,
the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary
servitude.20 Courts have strongly held that judicial compulsion of
services would violate the express command of the Thirteenth
Amendment, and therefore, “[f]or practical, policy and
constitutional reasons, . . . courts continue to decline to
affirmatively enforce employment contracts.”21
The provisional remedy of a preliminary injunction22 is
suspension because the court believed that one could not both suspend a
performer without pay and at the same time restrain the performer from
working elsewhere. Id.
17. See Poultry Producers of S. Cal., Inc. v. Barlow, 208 P. 93, 97 (Cal.
1922) (holding that the court would not order specific performance by the
defendant-poultry farmer, but would rather order monetary damages to the
co-op); JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS
ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ADAPTED FOR ALL THE
STATES AND TO THE UNION OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES UNDER THE
REFORMED PROCEDURE 943-44 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941).
18. See ABC, 52 N.Y.2d at 402 (quoting from a century-old opinion in De
Rivafinoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige Ch. 264, 270 (N.Y. Ch. 1833)):
I am not aware that any officer of this court has that perfect knowledge
of the Italian language, or possesses that exquisite sensibility in the
auricular nerve which is necessary to understand, and to enjoy with a
proper zest, the peculiar beauties of the Italian opera, so fascinating to
the fashionable world. There might be some difficulty, therefore, even if
the defendant was compelled to sing under the direction and in the
presence of a master in chancery, in ascertaining whether he performed
his engagement according to its spirit and intent.
19. Id. at 397.
20. Id; Louis Goldman, Equity—Negative Covenants in Contracts for
Personal Services, 10 S. CAL. L. REV. 340, 347-48 (1936-1937).
21. ABC, 52 N.Y.2d at 397; see also Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 317-18 (7th
Cir. 1894) (explaining that “[i]t would be an invasion of one’s natural liberty to
compel him to work for or to remain in the personal service of another.”);
Goldman, supra note 20, at 347-48.
22. Preliminary injunctions have been addressed in various entertainment
law cases involving the Lanham Act, copyright infringement, right of privacy,
the Cable Communications Act, and breach of personal service contracts. King
v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824, 825 (2d Cir. 1992); Lucasarts Entm’t Co. v.
Humongous Entm’t Co., 815 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Preliminary
Injunction Denied in Case Alleging Infringement of Copyrights to Set Dressings
in “Barney & Friends” Episodes, 15 ENT. L. REP. 9, 14-15 (Mar. 1994) (printing
the full text of Frank Schaffer Publications, Inc. v. The Lyons Partnership,
L.P., No. CV 93 3614 R (C.D. Cal. 1993)); Time, Inc. v. Sand Creek Partners,
825 F. Supp. 210, 212 (S.D. Ind. 1993); MCA Records, Inc. v. Newton-John, 90
Cal. App. 3d 18, 24 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1979); Motown Record Corp. v.
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particularly well suited to the entertainment industry because it
preserves the status quo. For example, Artist has signed an
exclusive recording contract with Company Records. The recording
contract provides that Artist shall record and deliver to Company
one album per year for two years and, at Company’s option,
further recordings for six additional years. Artist delivered and
Company has released two albums that have sold very well.
Company now wants to exercise its option for Artist’s third album.
However, Artist believes that Company is not aggressively
marketing and promoting Artist’s product to Artist’s satisfaction.
Artist also believes that Company has been withholding royalty
payments due to Artist in breach of the contract. Artist wants to
pursue a new musical direction and because of his loss of faith in
Company’s support, Artist wants to sign an exclusive recording
contract with XYZ Records, a competitor. As a consequence of the
break down in their relationship, Artist has commenced a lawsuit
against Company and Company has counterclaimed against
Artist. Artist announced that Artist will not record any further
recordings for Company and informed the media that Artist
intends to enter into an exclusive recording contract with XYZ
Records. While the lawsuit is pending, the best, and in reality, the
only way for Company to prevent Artist from breaking his
exclusive recording contract with Company, is the provisional
remedy of a preliminary injunction.
A preliminary injunction is usually applicable in the context
of an identifiable subject matter that is in danger of being removed
or destroyed and is a means of securing immediate judicial
intervention, generally at the outset of a lawsuit and before the
commencement of discovery and a full trial on the merits.
Although a seemingly more rigid standard would seem to apply
where First Amendment concerns are involved, the right to a
preliminary injunction is also a personal right as well as a real
and intellectual property right.23 The general purpose of a
preliminary injunction is to protect a party from irreparable harm
or injury by maintaining the status quo during the pendency of the
lawsuit. Most jurisdictions require that a hearing be held upon
notice to the adverse party and that the party seeking the
preliminary injunction post a bond. Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the court may order the trial of the action on the
merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the
application for a preliminary injunction.24
In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the applicant
must also demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits,

Brockert, 160 Cal. App. 3d 123, 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
23. Time, Inc., 825 F. Supp. at 212.
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(2).
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irreparable injury, and a balancing of the equities in favor of the
applicant.25 The court has broad discretion and may grant the
preliminary injunction even in the absence of explicit irreparable
harm. Some courts presume irreparable harm if an aggrieved
party proves a reasonable probability of success on the merits.26
Even if a party makes this requisite showing, a preliminary
injunction will generally be denied if a party has an adequate
remedy at law.
IV. ISSUES
Courts have become increasingly reluctant to grant negative
injunctions because of the consequence of effectively putting
performers completely out of work. In the absence of extreme
circumstances, which existed in some of the earlier cases that
demonstrated fairly egregious examples of “contract jumping,”27
courts have refused injunctions because of the absence of requisite
contractual provisions.
A good example of court application of these principles may be
seen in American Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Wolf.28 In this case, the
well-known sportscaster, Warner Wolf, had an employment
agreement with ABC containing a good-faith negotiation and firstrefusal provision that goes to the heart of the case.29 Between the
period commencing shortly before the required good faith
negotiation period and ending upon termination of Wolf’s contract
with ABC, various interactions (including meetings, discussions,
and exchange of papers) occurred between Wolf and ABC. There

25. King, 976 F.2d at 828.
26. See Manhattan Cable Tel., Inc. v. Cable Doctor, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 34,
37 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that some courts have eliminated the necessity of a
showing of irreparable harm if the defense lacks justification for their actions).
27. Machen v. Johansson, 174 F. Supp. 522, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
28. ABC, 52 N.Y.2d at 397.
29. Id. at 397-98. The pertinent part of the provision read as follows:
You agree, if we so elect, during the last ninety (90) days prior to the
expiration of the extended term of this agreement, to enter into good
faith negotiations with us for the extension of this agreement on
mutually agreeable terms. You further agree that for the first forty-five
(45) days of this renegotiation period, you will not negotiate for your
services with any other person or company other than WABC-TV or
ABC. In the event we are unable to reach an agreement for an extension
by the expiration of the extended term hereof, you agree that you will
not accept, in any market for a period of three (3) months following
expiration of the extended term of this agreement, any offer of
employment as a sportscaster, sports news reporter, commentator,
program host, or analyst in broadcasting (including television, cable
television, pay television and radio) without first giving us, in writing,
an opportunity to employ you on substantially similar terms and you
agree to enter into an agreement with us on such terms.
Id.
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were also interactions, to a large degree unbeknownst to ABC,
between Wolf and CBS, which resulted in Wolf leaving ABC and
going to work for CBS.30 Among other remedies, ABC sought an
injunction against Wolf’s employment as a sportscaster for CBS.
The court held that Wolf breached the good faith negotiation
clause of the contract with ABC but that ABC was not entitled to
injunctive relief.31
The court pointed out that after a personal service contract
terminates, the availability of equitable relief against the former
employee diminishes appreciably.32
Since the period of service has expired, it is impossible to decree
affirmative or negative specific performance. Only if the employee
has expressly agreed not to compete with the employer following the
term of the contract, or is threatening to disclose trade secrets or
commit another tortious act, is injunctive relief generally available
at the behest of the employer.33

There is clearly a judicial disfavor of anticompetitive
covenants contained in employment contracts based on the notion
that once the term of an employment agreement has expired,
general public policy favoring robust and uninhibited competition,
as well as a person’s right to a livelihood, should not give way
merely because a particular employer wishes to insulate himself
from competition.34 The court said:
Specific enforcement of personal service contracts thus turns

30. Id. at 398-99 (stating that:
The first-refusal period expired on June 3, 1980 and on June 4 Wolf was
free to accept any job opportunity, without obligation to ABC. Wolf first
met with ABC executives in September, 1979 to discuss the terms of
renewal contract. Counter proposals were exchanged, and the parties
agreed to finalize the matter by October 15. Meanwhile, unbeknownst to
ABC, Wolf met with representatives of CBS in early October. Wolf
related his employment requirements and also discussed the first
refusal-good faith negotiation clause of his ABC contract. Wolf furnished
CBS a copy of that portion of the ABC agreement. On October 12, ABC
officials and Wolf met, but were unable to reach agreement on a renewal
contract. A few days later, on October 16 Wolf again discussed
employment possibilities with CBS. Not until January 2, 1980[,] did
ABC again contact Wolf. At that time, ABC expressed its willingness to
meet substantially all of his demands. Wolf rejected the offer, however,
citing ABC’s delay in communicating with him and his desire to explore
his options in light of the impending expiration of the 45-day exclusive
negotiation period. On February 1, 1980, after termination of that
exclusive period, Wolf and CBS orally agreed on the terms of Wolf’s
employment as sportscaster for WCBS-TV a CBS-owned affiliate in New
York.)
31. Id. at 405.
32. Id. at 403.
33. Id. at 403.
34. Id. at 368.
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initially upon whether the term of employment has expired. If the
employee refuses to perform during the period of employment, was
furnishing unique services, has expressly or by clear implication
agreed not to compete for duration of the contract and the employer
is exposed to irreparable injury, it may be appropriate to restrain
the employee from competing until the agreement expires. Once the
employment contract has terminated, by contrast, equitable relief is
potentially available only to prevent injury from unfair competition
or similar tortious behavior or to enforce an express and valid
anticompetitive covenant. In the absence of such circumstances, the
general policy of unfettered competition should prevail.35

In applying the above principles, the court concluded that
because Wolf’s employment contact with ABC had terminated and
there was no express anticompetitive covenant made by Wolf,
ABC’s request for injunctive relief must fail.36
Seventeen years after Wolf, plaintiff Sue Nigra sued her
former employer, Young Broadcasting of Albany, to invalidate a
non-compete agreement.37 Nigra, who had been a broadcaster at
WTEN,38 was offered a contract renewal upon expiration of her
contract, but she rather accepted employment at a competing
station for double her old salary.39 However, her acceptance of the
new position, according to the defendant, violated the non-compete
covenant in her employment contract with defendant that stated:
[R]egardless of whether WTEN terminates an employee or the
employee does not renew its contract with WTEN at the salary that
WTEN offers, for a year thereafter the employee may not even work
for, much less appear on any commercial television station
(including cable, closed circuit or pay television) that broadcasts or
transmits to any place within the Albany-Schenectady-Troy area
[.]40

The court, following the Wolf decision, held that because the
plaintiff had completed the term of employment, the former
employer’s attempt to insulate itself from competition was not a
legitimate reason to enforce the restrictive covenant.41

35. Id. at 405.
36. Id.
37. Nigra v. Young Broad. of Albany, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 848, 849 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1998).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 848-49.
40. Id. at 848.
41. Id. at 850; see also Marlo D. Brawer, Switching Stations: The Battle
over Non-Compete Agreements in the Broadcasting Industry, 27 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. 693, 734 (2002) (stating that “[c]ovenants not to compete are forced on
employees as part of the conditions of employment. They are used to unduly
burden the employee . . . . [B]roadcast employers have an unfair advantage in
negotiating contracts with employees who are desperate to make a decent
living wage.”).
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A different result ensued in a New York case where the
defendant’s breach of a contract with the plaintiff to host a
television game show, which was being developed by the plaintiff,
and a subsequent contract with a competing production company
to host another game show called “To Tell The Truth,” resulted in
the issuance of a permanent injunction barring defendant from
appearing on “To Tell The Truth” or any other game show.42 The
court distinguished Wolf on the basis that it instead involved a
contract for employment which had expired, while in this case, the
contract for employment had not expired.43 Another issue in this
case concerned whether or not the defendant’s services were
sufficiently unique to meet the requirement as articulated in the
Wolf case. It should be noted generally that even where the
breaching party may have acted in good faith, truthfully believing
that he was not violating the subject contract provision, this will
not bar the imposition of an otherwise valid negative injunction.44
Uniqueness of the performer’s talents has always been a vital
issue with regard to seeking a negative injunction.45 In King
Records v. Brown,46 plaintiff-record company contracted with
defendant-vocalist, James Brown, for his exclusive professional
services in connection with the production of phonograph records
for five years.47 The contract recited that the defendant’s services
were unique and extraordinary, and substantial payments and
royalties were thereafter paid to defendant.48 During the term of
the contract, the defendant breached the contract by entering into
another agreement with a different recording company.49 The
court, stating that “[t]he nature and extent of the recordings made
by Brown under plaintiff’s contract and the large quantity thereof
publicly sold substantiate the contract characterization of Brown’s
services as unique and extraordinary,”50 and granted an
injunction.51
42. Zink Commc’ns v. Elliott, No. 90 Civ. 4297 (CSH), 1990 WL 176382, at
*30 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 1990), aff’d without opinion, 923 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1990).
43. DONALD E. BIEDERMAN, LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE ENTERTAINMENT
INDUSTRIES 498 (5th ed. 2007).
44. See Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon, 576 F.3d 1223, 1239 (11th Cir.
2009) (describing how the court was not persuaded that Florida law would
refuse to grant injunctive relief based on an employee’s good faith belief that
the employee did not violate a covenant not to compete).
45. See Shubert Theatrical Co. v. Gallagher, 201 N.Y.S. 577, 583 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1923) (granting an injunction where it was shown that defendants’
services were unique).
46. King Records, Inc., v. Brown, 21 A.D.2d 593, 594 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964).
47. Id. at 595.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 597 (stating that the injunction was “granted to the extent of
restraining [the Defendant] from vocal phonograph recordings and restraining
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An opposite result occurred in the case of Wilhelmina Models,
Inc. v. Abdulmajid52 where the court reversed the lower court’s
granting of an injunction against a fashion model who breached
her contract with the plaintiff-model agency.53 The lower court had
granted the injunction based primarily upon the above King case,54
and also because the contract in the subject case recited that the
defendant’s services were indeed extraordinary, unique, and that
there was no adequate remedy at law for the breach of the
agreement.55 The court, in carefully scrutinizing the “unique” and
“extraordinary” recitations, concluded that such language is not of
itself conclusive of such facts.56 The court said:
The uniqueness of defendant model’s services would seem to be
somewhat diluted by the fact that plaintiff apparently requires all of
the models it manages to sign contracts with such recitations; the
contract is obviously a form contract. Insofar as defendant model’s
services are “unique,” in the sense that she looks like herself and not
somebody else and is very popular, that uniqueness is not vis-a-vis
plaintiff but vis-a-vis the photographers and commercial
organizations who hire the model. Vis-a-vis plaintiff, defendant
model is simply one of a number of models whom plaintiff manages,
some of whom are in the same price category as defendant model[.]57

V. PAY OR PLAY/GARDEN LEAVE
A “pay or play” provision in an entertainment service contract
means that the artist is guaranteed payment as provided for in the
contract regardless of whether or not she actually render services.
In other words, the employer is free to utilize or not utilize the
artist’s services, but in any event, the artist will get paid.58 While
the corporate defendants from causing or providing such recordings or
manufacturing, distributing or selling any vocal phonograph recordings of
[the] defendant.”).
52. Wilhelmina Models, Inc. v. Abdulmajid, 413 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1979).
53. Id.
54. King, 21 A.D.2d at 593.
55. Wilhelmina Models, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 22-23.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 23 (distinguishing this case from King by pointing out that “[t]he
defendant model does not render any services to plaintiff nor does plaintiff pay
the defendant model. It is quite the other way around. Plaintiff renders
services to defendant model as manager and defendant model pays plaintiff.
Thus damages would appear to be an adequate remedy.”); see also Machen,
174 F. Supp. at 522.
58. See BIEDERMAN, supra note 43, at 110 (explaining that:
In the event [a] Company or Producer desires to terminate the services
of Director as the director of the Property, then notwithstanding that
this pay or play clause is exercised prior to completion of Director’s
services, Director shall be entitled to retain all fixed compensation paid
hereunder and Director shall be entitled to receive any unpaid balance
of fixed compensation provided herein.).
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pay or play provisions in entertainment contracts typically become
germane relative to damages issues,59 they also have application
relative to enforcement of a negative injunction, particularly as to
the issue of deprivation of the performer’s ability to earn a living.60
As noted earlier in Wolf, many courts are hostile to negative
injunctions that limit employee conduct after the term of
employment has ended.61 Additionally, there has been a lack of
consistency with respect to the “special and unique” issue. Some
cases on these grounds never support a negative injunction62 while
other cases, on the same grounds have shown support.63
English courts, having the same concerns as American courts,
have developed a way to enforce restrictive covenants by either
vitiating the need for a negative injunction, or in the alternative,
overcoming the free labor ideal argument. This has been
accomplished by an arrangement called “garden leave,” pursuant
to which an employer will continue to pay the employee her full
salary and benefits—without utilizing her services—to prevent her
from moving to a competitor, usually during an extended
contractual period of employment.64 The phrase garden leave
refers to the assumption that the employee will stay home and
work in her garden during that period while remaining financially
secure.65 While the subject period will likely be during the
extended term of employment, it is possible to provide for similar
garden leave after the term of employment, by option exercisable
by the employer. It is not a long jump to the concept of including
garden leave provisions as part of enforcement of non-compete
provisions in entertainment contracts.
Of particular importance concerning the concept of garden
leave relative to enforcement of a negative injunction after

59. With respect to computation of damages, liquidated damages,
mitigation of damages, consequential damages, etc., see Lynch v. CIBY 2000,
1998 CV 97-9022 (C.D. Cal.) (granting summary judgment for plaintiff in a
“pay or play” case where the court relied on Payne v. Pathe Studios, Inc., 6 Cal.
App. 2d 136 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935) and De La Palaise v. Gaumont-British
Picture Corp., Ltd., 39 Cal. App. 2d 461 (1940) for the proposition that “the
duty to mitigate does not apply when an employee seeks minimum
[guaranteed] compensation.”).
60. See generally Simons v. Fried, 98 N.E.2d 456 (N.Y. 1951); see generally
Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc., v. Strauman, 386 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. 1976).
61. ABC, 52 N.Y.2d at 398.
62. Id; see also Nigra, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 849; Wilhelmina Models, 413
N.Y.S.2d at 22-23.
63. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 64 (2d Cir. 1998); Natsource
LLC v. Paribello, 151 F. Supp. 2d 465, 473-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
64. See generally Greg T. Lembrich, Garden Leave: A Possible Solution to
the Uncertain Enforceability of Restrictive Employment Covenants, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 2291 (2002).
65. Id. at 2305 (explaining that “[d]uring this time the employee will not
have access to the employer’s confidential information.”).
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employment has ended is that it negates the argument that the
restriction deprives the individual from her ability to earn a
living.66 It has been persuasively argued that the garden leave
concept may be an important way for American courts to improve
upon the consistency in interpretation and enforcement of negative
injunction provisions:
Garden leave may be the solution for which American companies,
looking to protect themselves from the threat of opportunistic
employees joining competitors, have been searching. The restrictive
covenants traditionally used for this purpose, including noncompetition and non-solicitation agreements, have proven to be
largely ineffective because courts view them with considerable
skepticism and enforce them inconsistently. Garden leave, however,
has the potential to succeed where they have failed. Largely
overcoming the traditional objections to restrictive covenants,
garden leave is a much more equitable arrangement that
compensates the employee by forcing an employer to internalize the
cost of keeping the employee out of work.67

VI. INJUNCTION STATUTES
A number of states have statutes governing the enforceability
of restrictive covenants.68 In reviewing the various statutory
provisions of those states heavily involved in the entertainment
industries, particularly California, one finds that the statutes
basically recite that in order to provide the basis for injunctive
relief, the subject contract must: be in writing, provide for services
that are unique and extraordinary, and, most importantly, provide
for a minimum compensation.69
66. Id. at 2315.
67. Id. at 2323.
68. Cal. Civ. Code § 3423 (West 2012); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6301 (McKinney
2013).
69. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423 (West 2012), which provides for minimum
compensation:
(1) As to contracts entered into on or before December 31, 1993, the
minimum compensation provided in the contract for personal services
shall be at the rate of six thousand dollars ($6,000) per annum.
(2) As to contracts entered into on or after January 1, 1994, the criteria
of subparagraph (A) or (B), as follows, are satisfied:
(A) The compensation is as follows:
(i) The minimum compensation provided in the contract shall be
at the rate of nine thousand dollars ($9,000) per annum for the
first year of the contract, twelve thousand dollars ($12,000) per
annum for the second year of the contract, and fifteen thousand
dollars ($15,000) per annum for the third to seventh years,
inclusive, of the contract.
(ii) In addition, after the third year of the contract, there shall
actually have been paid for the services through and including the
contract year during which the injunctive relieve is sought, over
and above the minimum contractual compensation specified in
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There have been several cases of particular interest
interpreting the minimum compensation aspect of the California
statute.70 In Foxx v. Williams,71 the plaintiff, Redd Foxx, a wellknown entertainer in nightclubs and on phonograph records, sued
for an accounting, declaratory, and other relief against the
defendant-recording company that was distributing his
recordings.72 The defendant filed a cross-complaint for injunctive
relief to prevent the plaintiff from breaching the exclusivity clause
of his contract. The trial court granted the injunction restraining
the plaintiff “from making sound recordings for any other person,
firm or corporation . . . so long as royalties earned . . . equal or
exceed the sum of $3,000 [the then statutory minimum] for any
royalty period.”73
On appeal, the appellate court found that the royalty
payments were not guaranteed but rather contingent on album
sales, and therefore did not meet the requirements of the statute
even though the royalties actually earned over any given period
might exceed the required annual statutory rate.74
About a decade later, the court found grounds to enforce a
negative injunction in the case of MCA Records, Inc. v. NewtonJohn,75 which involved a recording contract between MCA, the
plaintiff-recording company, and the then internationally famous
Olivia Newton-John, the defendant-recording artist. The
agreement provided that the defendant was to record and deliver
two albums per year for an initial period of two years, and at
clause (i), the amount of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) per
annum during the fourth and fifth years of the contract, and
thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) per annum during the sixth and
seventh years of the contract. As a condition to petitioning for an
injunction, amounts payable under this clause may be paid at any
time prior to seeking injunctive relief.
(B) The aggregate compensation actually received for the services
provided under a contract that does not meet the criteria of
subparagraph (A), is at least 10 times the applicable aggregate
minimum amount specified in clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A)
through and including the contract year during which the injunctive
relief is sought. As a condition to petitioning for an injunction,
amounts payable under this subparagraph may be paid at any time
prior to seeking injunctive relief.
70. See generally Allen R. Grogan, Statutory Minimum Compensation and
the Granting of Injunctive Relief to Enforce Personal Service Contracts in the
Entertainment Industries: The Need for Legislative Reform, 52 S. CAL. L. REV.
489 (1979) (explaining that while the original minimum amounts have been
legislatively increased, the case law interpreting the statue under lower
amounts remains fundamental).
71. Foxx v. Williams, 244 Cal. App. 2d 223, 227 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
72. Id. at 227.
73. Id. at 230.
74. Id. at 244.
75. MCA Records, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 21.
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plaintiff’s option, further recordings in three one-year option
periods.76 Plaintiff was to pay defendant royalties as well as a nonreturnable advance of $250,000 for each album during the initial
two years and $100,000 for each album during the option years,
with the costs of recording to be borne by defendant.77
Following three recordings, both parties filed breach of
contract actions against the other and the trial court granted to
plaintiff a preliminary injunction barring defendant from
recording with anyone but plaintiff during the pendency of the
action.78 The defendant’s objection to the injunctive relief to
enforce the exclusivity provisions of the contract was based on the
contention that inasmuch as the defendant was required to bear
production costs of her recordings, her proceeds or net profits from
the guaranteed advances would be reduced below the statutory
guaranteed minimum payment.79 The court held that the
minimum compensation referred to in the statute did not mean
net profits, and further said: “even if it did, suitable recordings
could be made at costs that would net the defendant minimum
compensation of $6,000 [the then-minimum] a year. It is decisive
here that . . . exclusive control of production costs remained in the
defendant’s hands at all times.”80
As a result of the Foxx and MCA cases, many California
record companies started to include in their contracts, almost as a
matter of boilerplate, a clause providing for the company to have
an option exercisable at any time, to pay the recording artist the
statutory minimum compensation, thereby providing the basis for
enforcement of a negative injunction to enforce exclusively
provisions.81 In Motown Record Corp. v. Brockert, such an option
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. The preliminary injunction granted by the trial court was for the
pendency of the action or until April 1, 1982, two years after the termination
of the five-year contract. Id. While the preliminary injunction was affirmed, it
was modified by deleting the “or until April 1, 1982” language, as the court
held that the injunction could not extend the term of the contract beyond its
specified maximum. Id.
79. Id. at 22.
80. Id.
81. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423(e) (West 2012) (codifying the so-called
“Superstar Insurance” provision, where the company could make a single
payment equal to ten times the aggregate minimum amount required to
secure and maintain the right to injunctive relief in each of the years of the
contract); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526 (West 2012); see also PAUL C. WEILER,
ENTERTAINMENT, MEDIA, AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS 725 (2d
ed. 2002) (stating that:
For example, a label that did not pay the guaranteed minimums to an
artist in years one through three (i.e. $9,000 then $12,000 then $15,000),
but that released an extraordinarily successful album by the artist in
year four, could qualify to seek an injunction against the artist by
making a lump sum payment on the courthouse steps which, in this
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clause was at issue.82 The defendant-performer, professionally
known as Teena Marie, appealed a preliminary injunction
restraining her from performing her singing and songwriting for
anyone other than the plaintiff-recording and publishing
companies (Motown and Jobete, respectively) until their exclusive
contracts expired. The contracts provided each company with an
option exercisable at any time to pay Teena Marie the then
minimum statutory amount of $6,000 per year. After six years
under the contracts, Teena Marie notified Motown and Jobete that
she would no longer perform under the contracts.83 The following
month, Motown and Jobete exercised the $6,000 per year option.84
The court held that the option clause did not satisfy the statutory
requirement of minimum compensation based on the fact that the
legislative language refers to contracts that guarantee the
performers the minimum amount from the outset.85 The court
said:
The most reasonable, common sense reading of this language is that
“minimum compensation for such service” refers back to the
“contract in writing for . . . personal services.” To be subject to
specific enforcement, the contract must have as one of its terms a
compensation provision providing for payment at the minimum rate
of $6,000 per year. In other words, agreeing to payment of the
minimum compensation is not a condition precedent to the granting
of injunctive relief; it is a threshold requirement for admission of the
contract into the class of contracts subject to injunctive relief under
the statute.86

The court also noted that:
If we were to hold the option clause satisfies section 3423, we would
nullify the $6,000 compensation requirement as a counterweight on
the employer. Whereas the $6,000 compensation requirement was
intended to balance the equities, the $6,000 option clause is
intended to allow record companies to avoid payment of minimum
compensation while retaining the power of economic coercion over
the artist.87

case, would total $510,000 (ten times the $15,000 required for year 4,
plus $360,000 as ten times the total that was supposed to have been
paid during the first three years of the contract). By year seven, this
payment for an injunction would have to total $960,000 (less any
amounts that had actually been paid in prior years under the contract.).
82. Motown Record, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 126.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 127.
85. Id. at 135.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 140 (noting that this is accomplished by giving “the company
the coercive power of a credible threat of injunctive relief without it having to
guarantee or pay the artist anything” and that this threat could be as effective
as the injunction itself).
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In a 1986 case,88 in an attempt to circumvent the California
minimum compensation statute, a record company sought an
injunction not against the contract-breaching artist, but rather
against the rival record company that was seeking to employ her.
The case involved Anita Baker, a then unknown singer who had
recorded a modestly successful album for plaintiff and then
accepted a better deal with the defendant-record company.89 After
it was established that the plaintiff was not entitled to an
injunction against Ms. Baker because the minimum compensation
required by the statute had not been met,90 the plaintiff tried a
back door attempt by seeking the injunction against the rival
record company defendant. The court, in denying the injunction,
stated that “[w]hether plaintiff proceeds against Ms. Baker
directly or against those who might employ her, the intent is the
same: to deprive Ms. Baker of her livelihood and thereby pressure
her to return to plaintiff’s employ.”91
VII. OTHER ASPECTS
At times in the entertainment business, the negative
injunction being sought may not relate to an individual’s
performance, but rather to a specific creative property such as a
Broadway show, motion picture, or television show.92 In 2008, the
New York Supreme Court issued a preliminary injunction
preventing the airing of the hit cable television show “Project
Runway” on the Lifetime network.93 The dispute involved a
contract between NBC Universal and The Weinstein Company.94
The injunction prevented The Weinstein Company from moving
the hit show from NBC to another television network based on the
allegation that Weinstein breached NBC’s contractual right of first
88. Beverly Glen Music, Inc. v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 3d
1142, 1144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
89. Id. at 1143-44.
90. Id. at 1145.
91. Id. But how could damages be accurately calculated, given the
unknown future market for Baker’s performances?
92. See Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351,
355-56 (1978) (explaining that negative injunctions do not apply only to
individual performance but also to certain licenses, patent right, and other
“unique” items); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395
(2006) (holding that suits for injunctions involving patents were subject to the
same standards of equity as in other suits seeking a permanent negative
injunction).
93. See Bill Carter & Brian Stelter, “Project Runway” Move to Lifetime Is
TIMES
(Sept.
30,
2008),
Blocked,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/27/arts/television/27
runw.html?_r=0
(explaining that even though such injunctions are rarely granted in the
entertainment industry, the judge issued an order saying “Project Runway”
cannot be shown on Lifetime).
94. Id.
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refusal to the show.95 The parties ultimately settled the lawsuit
with The Weinstein Company agreeing to pay NBC an undisclosed
amount for the right to move the show.96
Performers are not the only parties who may violate their
personal service performing contracts. If a producer decides to
replace an actor or other creative person, such as a director or
choreographer, in breach of that individual’s contract, the issue
arises as to whether the individual may seek to enjoin the
enterprise from going forward. In the case of Gennaro v.
Rosenfield,97 the plaintiff, a well-known and successful
choreographer and dancer,98 was engaged to choreograph the
London stage production of “Singin’ In The Rain.”99 The contract
provided that Gennaro would have an option to choreograph any
future first-class production of the show in the United States,
including any Broadway production.100 During the successful run
of the London production, a Broadway production was planned
that did not include Gennaro.101 Gennaro sought a preliminary
injunction to enjoin the Broadway production from going
forward,102 arguing that he would suffer irreparable harm to his

95. Id.
96. See Meg James & Maria Elena Fernandez, “Project Runway” Lawsuit
Over; the Series Moves to Lifetime (updated), L.A. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2009),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/showtracker/2009/04/project-runway-lawsuitover-the-runway-series-moves-to-lifetime.html (explaining that since the
lawsuit has been settled, Project Runway can finally move to Lifetime); see
also Molly S. Machacek, “Make It Work”: Project Runway and Injunctive Relief
in the Television Industry, 14 CHAP. L. REV. 165, 175 (2010) (arguing against
negative injunctions in television and stating that:
Unlike real estate cases, in which each piece of disputed property is
unique, in the television industry it can be difficult to determine if a
property is unique enough to warrant the application of a preliminary
injunction. A television program, similar to music, films, and books, is
unique in the non-legal definition because it is a creative property that
conceivably comes from an original idea and ostensibly is the only one of
its kind: but these characteristics do not mean that the issuance of a
preliminary injunction is always an appropriate remedy when a
television show is involved.).
97. Gennaro v. Rosenfield, 600 F. Supp. 485, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
98. See id. at 487 (stating that Peter Gennaro “is a choreographer and
dancer. He has choreographed a number of well-known Broadway musicals,
including “Fiorello,” “The Unsinkable Molly Brown,” and “Annie” (for which he
won a Tony Award).”).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 488.
102. Id. (explaining that the requested injunction sought to prevent the
Broadway producer from:
(a) producing any American first-class stage production of the musical
“Singin’ In The Rain” (the “American production”) with choreography by
any choreographer other than Peter Gennaro; (b) entering into any
contract for choreography of the American production with any
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reputation and erosion of his professional skills.103
The court denied the injunction indicating that it could be
granted only if Gennaro could “show that the harm which he
would suffer from the denial of his motion is ‘decidedly’ greater
than the harm which [the defendants] would suffer if the motion
was granted.”104 While the court said that atrophy of professional
skills may constitute irreparable harm, it also said that this
principle was very limited and noted that Gennaro’s skills are not
likely to diminish or atrophy, citing the fact that “[s]ince he has
already choreographed the London production, the Broadway
production represents less than a unique opportunity to develop
his skills.”105
A negative injunction against a performer may not
necessarily seek to totally bar the performer from performing for a
specific entity or third party. Such would be the case regarding a
negative injunction to enforce a breach by a recording artist of a
“re-recording restriction” contained in most recording contracts.
Such a negative covenant typically provides that the artist will not
re-record material recorded for the record label for anyone else, not
only for the term of the agreement, but also for a certain amount of
time after the term of the agreement.106 The negative covenant
might run for five years from the date of release of the artist’s
recording for the label, or until two years after the date of
termination of the recording agreement.107
VIII. CONCLUSION
While the negative injunction as a contract remedy in breach
of entertainment contracts dates back to at least the 1800s,108 its
application remains inconsistent. While many cases indicate that
courts have become increasingly reluctant to grant them,109 other
cases demonstrate a willingness to grant them particularly under

choreographer other than Peter Gennaro; (c) advertising, promoting or
otherwise publicizing the American production, in print or any other
media, whereby the actual or prospective choreography is represented
as by any choreographer other than Peter Gennaro.).
103. Id. at 488-89.
104. Id. at 492 (citing Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ampco-Pittsburg Corp., 638 F.2d
568, 569 (2d Cir. 1981)).
105. Gennaro, 600 F. Supp. at 488.
106. See KASHIF, EVERYTHING YOU’D BETTER KNOW ABOUT THE RECORD
INDUSTRY 350 (Elsa Boyd et al. eds., 1st ed. 1996) (providing an example of
such a provision).
107. The purpose of such a provision is to prevent the artist from recording
the same material for a new label that would then be in direct competition
with sales of the original recording.
108. Lumley, 42 Eng. Rep. 687; 1 De. G. M. & G. 604.
109. ABC, 52 N.Y.2d at 402.
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distinct circumstances.110 The primary reasons for their denial
relate to the absence of clear and requisite contract provisions, the
availability of monetary damages, and the strong public policy
favoring robust and uninhibited competition as well as a person’s
right to a livelihood.
It is this author’s opinion that performers’ contracts are
personal promises that create moral and ethical responsibilities
upon which others reasonably rely, and which reliance should be
protected to the greatest extent provided for by the law.
Notwithstanding public policy as above noted, most entertainment
contracts have features that are distinctive from ordinary
employment contracts particularly in the areas of up-front
investments and risks in the creation of entertainment projects.
While it is clear that specific performance may not be granted to
force a performer to render her services,111 in many cases, the
existence of the negative injunction remedy is the only realistic
and effective way to prevent the sort of egregious breaches112 that
are regularly committed by performers in the pursuit of
maximizing their own personal profits and advancing their
careers.113 The negative injunction is the principal deterrent to
contract-jumping in the entertainment business. Additionally, the
application of the negative injunction should not only apply to
“stars,” but “up-and coming” artists as well, who make the same
contractual commitments and whose employers have a huge
economic stake in helping their career development.114

110. See, e.g., Grimston, 1 Q.B. 125; Harry Rogers Theatrical Enters., Inc.,
232 N.Y.S. at 2; Zink Commc’n, 1990 WL 176382, at *30; BIEDERMAN, supra
note 43; King Records, 21 A.D.2d at 597.
111. POMEROY, supra note 17, at 943.
112. See Joe Baltake, So Long, Sue Ya Later: When Stars Walk, Lawyers
Talk, and Some of Hollywood’s Biggest Courtroom Scenes Are Not on Film,
SACRAMENTO BEE, July 28, 1996, at EN18 (giving an extensive list of
examples of actors walking off movie sets, seemingly in breach of their
contracts).
113. Even if the final result—perhaps based on financial weight—may be
the performer’s decision to perform her original contractual services.
114. See Motown Record, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 137 (noting a trend toward
enforcing negative covenants against “prima donnas” but not against the
“spear carriers.”).
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